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NOTE
CATEGORICAL AND VAGUE CLAIMS THAT
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IS AFOOT: SOLVING
THE HIGH-CRIME AREA DILEMMA
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACTION
By Andrew Dammann
ABSTRACT
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court announced that mere presence in
a high-crime area is a constitutionally significant factor for deciding if there is
the necessary reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot in order to
justify a stop and frisk. Relying in part on the constitutional significance
Wardlow attached to the vague term high-crime area, New York instituted an
aggressive stop-and-frisk policy to combat crime and make New York a safer
city. New York was sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Floyd v. City of New
York. New York’s appeal was dropped when new mayor Bill de Blasio
agreed to the remedies outlined in the Floyd opinion. At the press conference
where Mayor de Blasio announced the settlement that dropped the appeal,
Police Commissioner William Bratton said, “[W]e will not break the law to
enforce the law.” This Article asserts that enforcing the law without breaking
it becomes impossibly problematic when the law is as uncertain as it is with
high-crime areas.
This Article begins with a critique of the uncertainty created by attaching
constitutional significance to high-crime areas without defining or describing
what a high-crime area is. The Article urges city councils and other appropriate legislatures to designate which areas are high-crime areas. It argues that
such a designation would foreclose the difficult problem of municipal liability
that Judge Scheindlin grappled with in Floyd, that legislative designations of
high-crime areas square with Fourth Amendment principles, and that legislatures, not executive auxiliaries like police departments, are the proper governmental bodies to make that designation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Late one night a young man in the Bronx is sent to the corner store
to buy some groceries for his mother; he grabs his older brother’s coat
on the way out the door by mistake. He runs, instead of walks, to the
store because of the cold and the crime. He is the “right kind of person” the NYPD officer waiting across the street watching was told to
stop and frisk. Minutes later, the young man is bent over a patrol car
as the police find a suspicious bag of white powder in his brother’s
coat. His protestations are met with the cold refrain: “If I had a nickel
. . . .” Under the exact same circumstances a young man in Upper
Manhattan, sent on the exact same chore, returns home with some
milk, some crackers, and some bread.
The dissimilar treatment between these two similarly situated young
men is constitutional1 even though the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment stand as a safeguard to equally secure both young
men in “their persons, houses, papers and effects from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”2 Police departments around the country face
the daunting task of ferretting out crime and protecting their officers’
safety while respecting the constitutional rights of suspects. Recognizing the perils of this daunting task the Supreme Court, in Terry v.
Ohio, held that limited intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights are
justified in the interest of ensuring the safety of law enforcement officers so long as there are “specific articulable facts” indicating that
criminal activity may be afoot.3 This reasonable-suspicion analysis allows considerable room for courts to defer to an officer’s experience.4
Under this analysis, seemingly innocent actions taken together with
“rational inferences” in light of the officer’s experience can form the
basis for a constitutional seizure commonly called a stop and frisk.5 In
Terry, the Court intended this individualized approach to balance the
indignity and stigma associated with being stopped and frisked by police against officer safety.6 Later in Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme
Court held that presence in a high-crime area can be one constitutionally significant factor needed to justify a stop and frisk, but not the
sole factor.7 Wardlow created a constitutionally significant factor unlike any other factor in the reasonable-suspicion analysis.8 Prior to
1. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119, 124 (2000).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
3. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
4. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274–75 (2002) (noting that reasonable
suspicion analysis “allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”).
5. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
6. Id. at 24–25.
7. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
8. See id.
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Wardlow, each “specific articulable fact” in the reasonable-suspicion
analysis had to be peculiar to the incident that precipitated the stop
and frisk.9 After Wardlow, police officers may enlist the categorical
claim that an incident took place in a high-crime area in aid of establishing that there was reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a suspect.10 The effect of Wardlow is that the young man in the Bronx gets
bent over a patrol car while the young man in Upper Manhattan jogs
home unmolested. Those in high-crime areas are one innocent “articulable fact” away from having their Fourth Amendment rights
evaporate, while those in more affluent areas retain robust Fourth
Amendment protections.11
High-crime areas present problems aside from the arguably unequal
scheme of Fourth Amendment protections they create.12 Uncertainty
regarding what a high-crime area is, how and who designates highcrime areas, and what evidentiary standards are required for reviewing
a high-crime area claim creates problems that cry out for solutions of
varying complexity.13 This Article does not call for an overruling of
Wardlow—it does not argue that the use of the high-crime area factor
in Fourth Amendment analysis is facially unconstitutional, nor does it
analyze the unequal scheme of Fourth Amendment protections implied by Wardlow. This Article merely analyzes the current scheme
under Wardlow; a broken and uncertain scheme that lacks clarity and
often results in no more than deference to a law enforcement officer’s
ad hoc determination that the stop and frisk took place in a high-crime
area. It urges city councils and other appropriate legislatures to substitute their deliberate democratic designations of what is and is not a
high-crime area for the ad hoc judgment of individual police officers.
Part II of this Article looks at the inherent problems with highcrime areas arising from the vagueness of the term. It points to the
9. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
10. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
11. See id. See also Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment
Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383, 423 (2001).
12. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area”
Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1591 (2008); see also Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “HighCrime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 181 (2011); see also Thomas R. Fulford, Writing
Scripts for Silent Movies: How Officer Experience and High-Crime Areas Turn Innocuous Behavior into Criminal Conduct, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 497, 499 (2012); see also
Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a
Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 136 (2002); see
also David Seawell, Wardlow’s Case: A Call to Broaden the Perspective of American
Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2001).
13. Compare Seawell, supra note 12, at 1120 (arguing that the issue of location
should be eliminated from Terry analysis), with Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 12,
at 1591 (arguing the “high-crime area” verification should require temporal and geographical bounds and a nexus between the incidents of the types of crimes committed
in an area and the types of crimes investigated).
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lack of guidance for the Supreme Court in analyzing the claim and the
review of high-crime area findings as questions of fact rather than as
questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact as contributing to
the lack of clarity, certainty, and uniformity in high-crime area jurisprudence. Finally Part II discusses the additional problems with highcrime areas in § 1983 cases such as Floyd.
Part III of this Article argues that legislative designations will simplify the analysis of high-crime area for the purposes of determining
municipal liability. Part IV argues that legislative designations of
high-crime areas square with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Part
V speculates on the virtues of the political process of legislatively
designating certain areas as high crime. Part VI concludes that legislative designations of high-crime areas provide simplicity, clarity, and
certainty to all those affected by the high-crime area in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
II. THE PROBLEM

WITH

HIGH-CRIME AREAS

It is a constitutional reality that individuals in high-crime areas have
less Fourth Amendment protections than those who are outside highcrime areas.14 The Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes a
high-crime area, nor has the Supreme Court described what a highcrime area looks like or what attributes and metrics differentiate highcrime areas. Aside from requiring more than mere presence in a highcrime area to justify a stop and frisk, the Supreme Court has yet to
develop any safeguards to protect against police claiming presence in
a high-crime area as pretext for impermissible racial profiling or acting
on arbitrary “hunches.”15 Because of the dearth of guidance from the
Supreme Court, a prevalent practice is for trial courts to merely defer
to an officer’s ad hoc determination that a suspect was in a high-crime
area.16 Some courts approach this problem by requiring different
levels of verification during evidentiary hearings.17 But even when
14. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
15. Id.
16. United States v. Dell, 487 F. App’x 440, 455 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that
unchallenged officer testimony was sufficiently specific to indicate that investigatory
detention took place in a “high-crime area”); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208
F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (“it’s a high-crime area, because the officers say it’s a
high-crime area.”) (Kozinski, J., concurring); C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181, 1195 (Fla.
2009) (relying on officer testimony and prior complaints to establish high-crime area);
People v. Jackson, 979 N.E.2d 965, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 982 N.E.2d
772 (Ill. 2013) (finding that an officer’s uncontradicted and undisputed testimony,
which is accepted by the trial court, is sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that
the incident occurred in a high-crime area).
17. United States v. Wright (Wright I), 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting three factors for trial courts to consider when making a high-crime area finding: (1) the nexus between type of crime committed in the area and type of crime
investigated; (2) the geographical bounds of the alleged high-crime area; and (3) the
temporal bounds of the alleged high-crime area).
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trial courts address the high-crime area claim, it often results in judicial notice confirming the officers’ ad hoc determination that the suspect was in a high-crime area.18
The practice of deferring to a law enforcement officer’s ad hoc determination of the character of an area under Wardlow would not be
such a problem if a uniform evidentiary scheme was developed to test
the claim that a suspect was stopped and frisked in a high-crime area.19
But, development of such a scheme is impeded because high-crime
areas are generally considered questions of fact.20 As such, appellate
courts review the findings of trial courts concerning the high-crime
character of areas under a highly deferential standard.21 If the highcrime character of a particular area is a question of fact, and not a
question of law or a mixed question of law and fact, then appellate
courts must review that finding under a clearly erroneous standard.22
Therefore, the different evidentiary standards and mechanisms that
trial courts use to verify high-crime area claims perpetuate inconsistency within an already unequal scheme of Fourth Amendment protection.23 The evidentiary scheme remains inconsistent because
appellate courts cannot martial the various standards and mechanisms
into a consistent approach.24 Moreover, the evidentiary scheme for
testing high-crime area claims is likely to remain inconsistent not only
because high-crime area findings are questions of fact, but also because of the uncertainty inherent in the high-crime area distinction
itself.25
Courts have been very reluctant to consider the high-crime character of an area as anything other than a question of fact.26 The standard of review is not the only impediment to appellate reviews of high
crime areas—a trial court may refuse to classify an area as “high
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See also State v. Burns, 877 So. 2d
1073, 1078 (noting that a trial court can take judicial notice of the “high-crime” nature
of an area); State v. Francis, 2010-1149 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/16/11), 60 So. 3d 703, 708,
writ denied, (La. 2011), 71 So. 3d 311 (noting Louisiana Fifth Court of Appeals’ practice of taking judicial notice of the “high-crime” character of an area).
19. See, e.g., Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to Support an Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” Designation, 38
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 106 (2012).
20. Wright I, 485 F.3d at 53 (“We see no reason to treat the character of the stop’s
location as other than a factual issue.”).
21. People v. Jackson, 979 N.E.2d 965, 973–74 (Ill. App. Ct 2012), appeal denied,
982 N.E.2d 772 (Ill. 2013) (“[T]he trial court’s factual findings, concerning whether
this is or is not a high-crime area, are entitled to a great deal of deference.”).
22. Wright I, 485 F.3d at 53; United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir.
2004) (applying clearly erroneous standard to trial courts finding that incident did not
take place in a high-crime area).
23. Wright I, 485 F.3d at 53.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 50 (“I do not conclude on this evidence that the area is a, quote, high
crime area, close quote. Primarily because I’m not clear what that is.”) (quoting colloquy from the trial court).
26. Id. at 53.
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crime” because the trial judge does not know what that means.27
Turning a blind eye to the high-crime area issue because a judge cannot figure out “what that means” presents an unassailable obstacle to
developing a uniform evidentiary scheme to test the claim that a stop
and frisk took place in a high-crime area. This obstacle is clear in
Wright I and Wright II.28 But the obstacle presented in Wright I and
Wright II becomes irrelevant if city councils take on the responsibility
of designating high-crime areas.
The troubles with high-crime areas did not come out of the blue.29
Ever since Wardlow was decided in 2000, judges, practitioners, and
scholars have expressed concerns about the abuse of the high-crime
area factor in the Fourth Amendment analysis.30 The recently settled
case Floyd v. The City of New York31 brings these concerns into a
novel and stark contrast in the context of a § 1983 claim for the systematic abuse of, among other things, the high-crime area factor in the
NYPD’s stop-and-frisk protocols.32 Floyd muddied an already cloudy
question by adding another problem: At what point does the abuse of
high-crime area claims become a policy or practice such that a municipality itself is liable for deprivations of constitutional rights under
color of state law?33
In Floyd, District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin attempted to answer
this question,34 and in doing so she begged for a reconsideration of
high-crime area jurisprudence. Judge Scheindlin concluded that institutional police pressures to increase stops coupled with department
27. United States v. Wright (Wright II), 582 F.3d 199, 219–20 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting the “troubling inconsistencies in the trial court’s remarks.” The trial court refused
to find that the area was “high-crime” under Wardlow while recognizing that the officers were competent to ascribe significance to the character of the area.) (Lipez, J.
dissenting).
28. The discussions of “high-crime” areas in Wright I and Wright II are dicta as the
trial courts refused to make a finding on whether the Dorchester area of Boston was a
“high-crime area” probably because the trial courts did not know what a “high-crime
area” was and because the appellate courts did not direct the trial courts to reconsider
the question on remand. Wright I and II are examples of how the regime that has
evolved since Wardlow is unworkable because the colloquies from the trial court, the
dicta, and dissents clearly show that the alleged “high-crime” character of the
Dorchester area of Boston was a factor in the officers decision to stop and frisk
Wright even though the trial and appellate courts refused to make explicit findings on
whether Dorchester was a “high-crime area” or not.
29. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 124, 139 (2000). (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[P]resence in a high crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to
innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry.”).
30. See generally supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
31. As of this writing it is not known whether the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
will allow various police unions to intervene in the appeal dropped by the city of New
York.
32. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
appeal dismissed, (Sept. 25, 2013).
33. See id.
34. See id.
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stop-and-frisk practices created a “predictable formula for producing
unjustified stops.”35 In her analysis, Scheindlin considered the UF-250
form—the form that NYPD officers submitted after conducting routine stop and frisks.36 This form tracked the justification for the stop
and frisks by providing boxes, which corresponded to categories of
“articulable facts” that gave rise to the officer’s “reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity [was] afoot.”37 The admittedly conservative
analysis showed that of the more than 200,000 UF-250 forms submitted on unjustified stops, high-crime area was checked more than any
other factor listed.38 Her conclusion that this “predictable formula”
constituted a § 1983 violation begs a reconsideration of the most significant ingredient in this formula, the high-crime area factor.
The constitutionality of considering a suspect’s presence in a highcrime area in Fourth Amendment analysis was definitively decided by
the Supreme Court in Wardlow.39 Though the alleged § 1983 violations in Floyd were not limited to high-crime areas, the role of that
factor in the NYPD’s systematic Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
violations cannot be ignored, nor can the inherent temptation to use
high-crime areas as a pretext for racial profiling and other impermissible police tactics.40 Floyd makes very real the fear that citizens’ right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures will be routinely
violated merely because they are on the wrong side of the proverbial
tracks.41 Since a scheme of unequal Fourth Amendment protection is
currently the reality, it is imperative that the parameters of that inequality be clearly defined, simple to apply, and carry the imprimatur
of the democratic process.
The legislative solution proposed in this Article will foreclose the
legion of problems associated with high-crime areas. These problems
stem from the fact that considering the character of an area does not
fit with the requirements of Terry, namely that an officer be able to
point to “specific articulable facts” to justify a stop and frisk.42 The
claim that a suspect was in a high-crime area is not specific, and as
Wright I and Wright II show, it is very difficult to articulate.43 Because
they are categorical claims, high-crime areas are simply unlike the
facts considered in a traditional Fourth Amendment totality-of-thecircumstances analysis.44 When listening to the litany of factors given
35. See id. at 602.
36. Id. at 559.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
40. See generally Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
41. See id.
42. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968).
43. See United States v. Wright (Wright I), 485 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2007); United
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004).
44. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
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by a police officer, it is easy to point to which one of these things is not
like the others. Given that high-crime areas do not comport with
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, coupled with the fact that the
point of stop and frisks is to protect individual police officers and public safety, it is not surprising that trial courts tend to defer to police
officers’ impressions.45
Instead of merely deferring to police officers’ claims that a suspect
was in a high-crime area, city councils, relying on statistical data and
public sentiment, should designate which particular areas are highcrime areas. Doing so would shield police officers from liability when
conducting stop and frisks in these legislatively designated high-crime
areas.46 It would also provide certainty to the citizens in the ghetto, to
police officers walking the beat, and to federal judges hearing motions
to quash and § 1983 claims, where the issues are unjustified stop and
frisks. This legislative solution would remove a constitutionally problematic factor from the police officer’s calculus, thus increasing officer
safety by reducing officers’ hesitation.47 Finally, assigning the highcrime area designation to the political process would provide transparency and could also foster political involvement by those most affected by crime.
III. LEGISLATIVE DESIGNATIONS WILL SIMPLIFY MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY BASED ON FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes civil liability on anyone who, acting under
color of state law, deprives a citizen of his or her constitutional
rights.48 Based on actions taken under their official capacity, state officers’ may be held personally liable under § 1983.49 A stop and frisk
undoubtedly can form the basis for a § 1983 claim against an individual officer.50
Damages for successful § 1983 claims can reach into city coffers as
well.51 In Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court held that municipalities may be held vicariously liable
45. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 12, at 1590.
46. See Coward v. Town & Vill. of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 305 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (declining to find individual employees of city liable under § 1983 absent a
showing of personal involvement in the deprivation of constitutional rights motivated
by racial discrimination). See also Oliver v. Univ. of Conn. Health Care, 292 F. Supp.
2d 398, 410 (D. Conn. 2003) (noting requirement for personal involvement in deprivation as a prerequisite for damages under § 1983).
47. See generally Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
49. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991).
50. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D. N.Y. 2013); see
also El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 460 (8th Cir. 2011); Verdier v. Borough, 796 F. Supp. 2d 606, 631 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
51. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324,
334 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012).
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under § 1983 for the actions of their officials even if the action, which
visited the deprivation of constitutional rights, did not receive “formal
approval through the body’s official decision-making channels.”52
Clearly the individual police officer walking the beat is neither a
lawmaker nor a policymaker of the municipality.53 But, affirmative
policies are not the only municipal actions that create § 1983 liability.54 A municipality’s inaction regarding constitutional violations by
its officers can have the “force of law” sufficient to subject the municipality to vicarious liability under § 1983.55 The Monell question is
whether the officer is acting pursuant to a municipal policy, custom, or
practice such that the municipality as well as the individual officer is
liable under § 1983 for the violation of a citizen’s constitutional
rights.56
The question of municipal liability is not an easy one.57 It is made
more difficult in light of Wardlow.58 With the current practice, in order to decide if the municipality is liable for damages under § 1983,
courts are required to parse out when an officer’s stop and frisk of a
suspect in a high-crime area is pursuant to a municipal policy (or tacit
inaction sufficient to carry the “force of law”) and when the officer’s
stop and frisk is not.59 This is precisely the question in Floyd.60 It
took Judge Scheindlin over 100 pages to conclude that the City of
New York was liable for the actions of its police officers under Monell.61 Part of the problem with Floyd is that the opinion does not
meet the high-crime area problem head on.62 The high-crime area
problem becomes two-fold when both the initial determination of the
high-crime area and the judicial review are opaque.
Floyd demonstrates that Monell and Wardlow make strange bedfellows.63 Where the predicate constitutional violation for a § 1983 claim
52. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
53. See Woodley v. Town of Nantucket, 645 F. Supp. 1365, 1377 (D. Mass. 1986).
54. See Cash, 654 F.3d at 334.
55. Id.
56. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.
57. Id.; see also Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563–64 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2010) (concluding
that Monell’s “policy or custom” requirement applies to prospective as well as monetary relief); Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (discussing the potential
for municipal liability that may arise from inadequate training); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361 (2011) (declining to extend municipal liability for failure to
train prosecutors on Brady requirements).
58. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 580.
59. See Humphries, 131 S. Ct. at 453 (concluding that as long as a plaintiff can
show a policy or practice there may be prospective or monetary relief).
60. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
61. Id. at 658.
62. Id. at 556 (Floyd addressed systematic violations of Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under a general “stop and frisk” policy, not the acute challenge to
the use of “high-crime areas” in the “stop and frisk” policy.).
63. See id.
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is an unjustified stop and frisk premised on the suspect’s presence in a
high-crime area, deference to the officer’s ad hoc determination that
the area is sufficiently high crime to be constitutionally significant creates considerable uncertainty for all the parties involved. Is a finding
that an area is high crime binding on later § 1983 litigation? If so, how
specific must those findings be? How much experience must law enforcement officers have to merit deference to their judgment? How
many articulable factors are required to conduct a constitutional stop
and frisk in a poor neighborhood? How does a federal judge hearing
a § 1983 claim know whether to simply hold the officer liable or to
extend the liability to the municipality under Monell? Or does judicial
deference to law enforcement officers’ high-crime area claims weigh in
favor of a finding that there is a policy or practice sufficient to carry
the force of law such that the district judge hearing the § 1983 claim
may find the municipality liable? If city councils simply designate
which areas are “high crime” relative to permissible stop and frisks,
then all these questions will be foreclosed.
Not only do the high-crime areas confuse the question of municipal
liability, it also is bad policy to give law enforcement officers the discretion to determine if their suspect is in a high-crime area and then to
subject them to civil liability for exercising that discretion.64 It is an
even worse policy to simply turn a blind eye to violations of constitutional rights committed under color of law.65 If § 1983 claims for
pretextual stop and frisks are taken seriously, then encouraging officers to use their discretion and then second guessing the exercise of
that discretion under the threat of civil liability will create considerable uncertainty on the streets and in the courtroom. Police officers
must act quickly and second guessing their actions in federal court
creates doubt and hesitation.66 This uncertainty would be eliminated
if high-crime areas were definitively designated by city councils because the officers would know for sure when their suspects are actually in high-crime areas, and that designation would carry the weight
of the political process. The officers would know when a suspect is in
a high-crime area with certainty and would not hesitate to stop and
frisk a suspect based on a suspicious furtive movement. And considerable judicial resources will be conserved by simple deference to legislative designation of which areas are high-crime rather than spending
64. Tanner v. San Juan Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1116 (D.N.M.
2012); see, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 600 (1st Cir. 1974) (declining to secondguess correction officers decision to lockdown a prison); Gibson v. CharlottesvilleAlbemarle Joint Sec. Complex, 401 F. Supp. 544, 546 (W.D. Va. 1975) (declining to
second-guess treatment decisions of prison medical personnel).
65. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (finding municipal liability
under § 1983 when policy makers are deliberately indifferent to the need for adequate
training).
66. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979).
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time considering various pieces of evidence proffered to support a
high-crime area claim.
Similarly, a legislative designation would make the decision on municipal liability an easier one: An officer who goes rogue and subjects
citizens to stop and frisks outside the legislatively designated highcrime areas without individualized suspicion would clearly not expose
their departments or the municipalities to Monell liability because it
would be obvious that she is acting contrary to municipal policy embodied in the legislative designations.67
As Floyd demonstrates, stop and frisk procedures and justifications
create a tension between crime prevention and officer safety on the
one hand, and protection of civil liberties, namely Fourth Amendment
rights, on the other.68 This tension is made unnecessarily problematic
by the constitutional significance that attaches to presence in a highcrime area.69 The current practice of deferring to an officer’s ad hoc
determination that a suspect is in a high-crime area makes the question of whether to hold the municipality liable under § 1983 almost
impossible.70 By relieving the officer of the task of determining what
is and is not a high-crime area and assigning that designation to city
councils the § 1983 liability is clear. The officer is either acting pursuant to the municipal policy or practice when relying on high-crime
area designations or is not. If an officer’s stop and frisk is not conducted within one of the legislatively designated high-crime areas
without particularized suspicion and the Fourth Amendment violation
is not collaterally estopped by the findings in the suppression hearing,71 only that officer is liable, not the city or police department.72
Floyd is but one example of the problems created by the inherent uncertainty in the scheme created post-Wardlow. Legislative designations would not only remove the uncertainty of high-crime areas in
§ 1983 claims but also in traditional Fourth Amendment forums.
IV. LEGISLATIVE DESIGNATIONS OF HIGH-CRIME AREAS
COMPORT WITH FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Legislatively designated high-crime areas not only provide for
greater certainty within the context of § 1983 claims, they also square
with several Fourth Amendment policies and precedents. In his much
cited article “Case-by-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, Professor Wayne R. LaFave discusses
67. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
68. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556.
69. United States v. Wright (Wright I), 485 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2007).
70. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
71. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 (1980) (holding that principles of res adjudicata preclude a § 1983 suit where the predicate constitutional violation was alleged
unreasonable search and seizure found valid by a prior suppression hearing).
72. Monell, 436 U.S. 690–91.
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the tension highlighted by the Court’s grant of generalized authority
to search incident to arrest.73 The tension was between the long history of case-by-case adjudication and the practical concerns of police
in the field.74 Professor LaFave notes that although a test that weighs
a multitude of factors might be theoretically perfect, the reality of law
enforcement practice and Fourth Amendment guarantees require
rules with more clarity than sophistication.75 Though the article focuses on searches incident to arrests, the authority to search incident
to arrest is no less generalized under Robinson than are high-crime
area claims categorical under Wardlow.76 Furthermore, the temptation to arrest for a minor violation as pretext to search a suspect,
which attends the generalized grant of authority to search incident to
arrest, is analogous to the temptation to throw out the categorical
claim that an area was high crime to bolster a less than reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.77 Moreover, the same concerns and policy considerations apply to the high-crime area justification: officer safety and pretext.78
Officer safety is a valid and constitutionally significant policy consideration.79 It is bad policy to ask police to carefully balance a multitude of factors before frisking a suspect because such a requirement
would cause the officer to hesitate thereby jeopardizing her safety.80
It is good policy to have clear rules understandable by police (and
citizens alike) so that police can take swift, decisive action to secure
their own and the public’s safety.81
Legislative designation of high-crime areas will enable police to take
swift, decisive action based on a sole articulable factor that criminal
activity is afoot so long as that encounter takes place in a legislatively
73. Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 132 (Philip B. Kurland ed.,
1974).
74. Id. at 141.
75. Id.
76. The dissent in Robinson pointed out that the generalized authority to search
incident to an arrest was “a clear and marked departure from our long tradition of
case-by-case adjudication of the reasonableness of searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 239 (1973) (Marshall
J., dissenting). Similarly the dissent in Wardlow was troubled by the generic nature of
flight and “high-crime areas.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 139 (2000). (Stevens
J., dissenting).
77. Accord Lafave, supra note 73, at 132; Herbert, supra note 12, at 136.
78. See LaFave, supra note 73, at 148.
79. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1968); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
111 (1977) (“What is at most a mere inconvenience cannot prevail when balanced
against legitimate concerns for the officer’s safety.”) (per curiam); Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).
80. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.”).
81. Id.
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designated high-crime area.82 The certainty of the legislative solution
will embolden police to act without hesitation because the officers will
know that their consideration of the high-crime area, when deciding to
stop and frisk a suspect, is sanctioned by the democratic process.83
Moreover, legislative designations would put both the culpable and
the innocent alike on notice that they are in fact in a high-crime area
and are thus a single innocuous movement away from a nonconsensual and potentially unpleasant police encounter.84
The temptation for pretext presented by high-crime areas is no less
than the temptation for pretextual arrests discussed by Professor
LaFave.85 In his article, Professor LaFave proposed excluding everything but weapons when the justification for a stop and frisk is officer
safety.86 His solution of excluding everything but weapons would
have fundamentally altered the scope and application of the exclusionary rule.87 Although Professor LaFave’s solution would surely
have eliminated the temptation to use officer safety as a pretext for
unjustified intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights, it gained little
traction.88 Similarly, by eliminating the ad hoc character of a highcrime area, claim, the legislative solution eliminates the risk that such
a claim will be pretext for discriminatory stop and frisks. When police
are not walking the beat in a legislatively designated high-crime area,
they will have to show the requisite individualized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot that was required prior to Wardlow in order to
justify a stop and frisk.89
The legislative solution has an advantage over other proposed solutions to the high-crime area dilemma because, where other solutions
resolve the uncertainty further down the line in court or in the police
station, the legislative solution resolves the uncertainty before it can
82. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125–26 (2000) (deference to legislative designations of a “high-crime area” does not violate the stricture in Wardlow that neither
flight not presence in a “high-crime area” standing alone is sufficient to justify a “stop
and frisk” because the government would still have to point to one additional articulable fact indicating that criminal activity was afoot).
83. See Part III supra.
84. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (stating flight in a “high crime area” justifies a
“stop and frisk”); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(noting furtive movement and “high-crime area” were the most commonly checked
boxes on the UF-250 forms to justify a “stop and frisk”).
85. LaFave, supra note 73, at 155 (Professor LaFave explains that the temptation
to arrest for a minor traffic violation as a pretext for a search has the same justification as presented in Wardlow, that is: search for weapons and officer safety.).
86. Id. at 156 (To date the exclusionary rule is an all or nothing proposition as the
Court has declined to allow the justification for a particular type of Fourth Amendment stop or search to dictate the type of evidence admissible at trial as Professor
LaFave suggested in the Robinson Dilemma.); see also LaFave, Warrantless Searches
and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the “Quagmire,” 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30
n.76 (1972).
87. LaFave, supra note 73, at 156.
88. Id. at 163.
89. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1968).
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cause confusion on the streets or in the courtroom. Andrew Guthrie
Ferguson and Damien Bernache suggest a solution to the problems
with the high-crime area. Their solution is:
[R]equiring an empirical and verifiable factual basis to support the
assertion that an area or neighborhood is a “high-crime area”
before that information may be used to evaluate a Fourth Amendment stop. This evidence of the character of the area must be specific to the crime charged. Furthermore, this objectively based
knowledge must not only be known to the individual officer, but
must be known before making the contested Fourth Amendment
stop. In this way, the character of the area will be directly and relevantly linked to the otherwise ambiguous actions observed by the
police officer. This objective factual basis can be established with
existing data regularly collected by law enforcement organizations.
Intriguingly, this solution was suggested by the National Association
of Police Organizations, Policemen Benevolent and Protective Association of Illinois (“NAPO”) in its amicus brief before the Supreme Court in the Wardlow case.90

By requiring the geographic and temporal bounds of a high-crime area
to be drawn at the police station and the nexus to the investigated
crime drawn on the streets, Ferguson and Bernache take on the dilemma at a different place in the process. Moreover, Ferguson and
Bernache take a slightly different approach to framing the high-crime
area problem.91 They focus on defining what a high-crime area is and
how courts should make that finding.92 They cite several different approaches from various jurisdictions, ranging from mere deference to
police testimony to judicial notice to requiring arrest reports that support the claim that a stop and frisk took place in a high-crime area.93
Since their concern is what is required for a court to find that an area
is indeed high crime, it is not surprising that their solution amounts to
requiring verification of the claim that the police intervention took
place in a high-crime area.94 Ferguson and Bernache propose a verification method that goes beyond simply pointing to general crime data
that supports the allegation that an area is high crime; instead their
solution requires a nexus between the types of crime in the area and
the particular crime that the law enforcement officer happens to be
investigating.95
While their solution is an effective safeguard against pretextual
claims of presence in high-crime areas, it does not square with the jus90. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 12, at 1595 (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted).
91. Id. at 1606–07 (exploring the “definitional problem of the high-crime area
terminology”).
92. Id. at 1605–07.
93. Id. at 1607–09.
94. See id. at 1623–40.
95. Id. at 1635.
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tification for stop and frisks provided by the Court in Terry, namely
concerns for officer safety based on a suspicion that the suspect may
be armed.96 The empirical data regularly collected by law enforcement organizations, though useful in investigating crime and deploying officers, does little to inform the individual officer’s suspicion
that a specific suspect may be armed. It is more likely that officers’
subjective experiences will bear more on their decisions than will
lengthy crime data reports that the officers may or may not
remember.97
Because Ferguson and Bernache’s solution views the problem from
the courtroom, it fails to consider the actual effect requiring empirical
verification will have on the individual officer discharging their duties.
The empirical solution does little to provide police with the clarity and
certainty they need in order to discharge their duties without hesitation.98 This “theoretically perfect” solution is not practical from a law
enforcement standpoint.99 A police officer faced with a potentially
dangerous situation cannot be expected to recall the current crimemapping statistics before acting, let alone discern a nexus between the
crime he or she is investigating and the incidents of that type of crime
in the particular neighborhood reflected in the current crime-mapping
report. This tension between sophistication and simplicity is precisely
the problem that Professor LaFave discussed in The Robinson Dilemma.100 Although Ferguson and Bernache’s solution gets at precisely what a high-crime area looks like with statistical sophistication
and precision, the reality of high-crime areas within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires simplicity and clarity that a statistically
precise and sophisticated standard cannot provide.101 Law enforcement officers walking the beat can no more be expected to carefully
balance Fourth Amendment rights against interests in ferretting out
crime than they can to measure statistical analyses and identify a
nexus between that data and their investigation.102 Police must act
96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1968).
97. See generally Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks:
The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 753 (2010) (noting the tension between officers’ subjective
experience and training and the Supreme Court’s “admonition that probable cause
and reasonable suspicion are to be measured in objective terms”).
98. See LaFave, supra note 73, at 141.
99. See supra pp. 574–75.
100. LaFave, supra note 73, at 143 (noting that the difficulty officers face when
making the decision to “stop and frisk” based in part on presence in an alleged “highcrime area” i.e. drawing the geographic and temporal grounds of the area and discerning a nexus between the prevalence of the crime the officer is investigating in that
area is analogous to the difficult task of making a separate probable cause determination for a search for evidence after an arrest).
101. See id.
102. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979).
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quickly, and Ferguson and Bernache’s solution will cause them to
hesitate.
If Ferguson and Bernache’s approach requiring objective verification of the high-crime area as adopted by the First Circuit takes hold,
the law could develop in one of two ways. Courts may continue to
defer to law enforcement’s subjective impressions under judicial notice or a less rigorous analysis. Alternatively, courts may subject the
proffered data verifying an officer’s ad hoc determination to rigorous
scrutiny. The former would leave the risk of unconstitutional seizures
visited under color of state law undisturbed. The latter would require
the expenditure of considerable judicial resources as the evidentiary
hearings previously limited to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis could open the door to Daubert motions challenging the statistical reliability of the objective data proffered to support the officers’ determinations.103 A simple legislative designation of highcrime areas would protect Fourth Amendment rights while conserving
judicial resources by making this empirical verification unnecessary.
That is not to say that crime-mapping technology and statistical reports have no place in solving the high-crime area problem. To be
sure, the data collected by law enforcement organizations should be
put to use in designating which areas are high crime, but that data
should be considered by more deliberate bodies—city councils. City
councils are in a much better position to consider the data and weigh
it against public sentiment before they designate an area as high
crime. City councils’ use of such information would not be limited to
merely designating which areas are high crime, it would be useful for
budgeting and various other community projects.
V. CITY COUNCILS ARE THE PROPER BODIES
HIGH-CRIME AREAS

TO

DESIGNATE

City councils are best suited to designate what is and is not a highcrime area because city councils are in the best position to review relevant crime data, have a stake in such designations, and consider public
sentiment in alleged high-crime areas. Moreover, as a democratically
elected body, city councils’ high-crime area designations would carry
the weight of the political process and would thus be more deserving
of judicial deference.104
103. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93
(1993) (providing the standard for evaluating scientific and technical expert testimony
under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
104. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 87, (2010) (“This ‘narrow proportionality
principle’ does not grant judges blanket authority to second-guess decisions made by
legislatures . . . . ”); Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 488 (2005)
(“[W]e decline to second-guess the City’s considered judgments about the efficacy of
its development plan . . . ”); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449
(1978) (Blackmun J., concurring) (“[T]he Court will not second-guess legislative judg-
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While an individual police officer is not in a position to carefully
consider crime-mapping reports and statistical analysis when determining what is and is not a high-crime area,105 a city council is. Legislatures, such as city councils, are far more deliberate bodies than
individual police officers.106 Professor LaFave’s insight into why
Fourth Amendment rules should be more clear than sophisticated
does not apply to legislative bodies.107 While a police officer needs to
make swift decisions without hesitation, the meetings of legislatures
are deliberate and methodical by design.108 Thus, city councils and
other legislative bodies are in the best position to consider the types of
data that Ferguson and Bernache suggest be used in evidentiary hearings to verify a police officer’s claim that an area is high crime.
Though objective crime data would certainly inform city council’s
designation of high-crime areas, nothing would prevent a city council
from considering public sentiment in its decisions. Legislatively designated high-crime areas would give city councils another method of responding to public concerns about crime rates. City councils would
certainly give due weight to citizens’ concerns about security, property
values, and police practices when deliberating which areas call for the
high-crime area designation.
Crime is a subject of great public interest. New York Mayor Bill de
Blasio has been accused of “playing politics with public safety” by settling Floyd.109 But politicizing crime rates is nothing new.110 Crime
rates have been and continue to be common issues in political campaigns. Candidates often deride their opponents as being “soft on
ment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate
commerce.”).
105. See supra p. 569.
106. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575,
1796–97 (2001) (noting that “the vagueness doctrine serves to push responsibility for
constitutionally troublesome judgments about criminality away from individual law
enforcement officers (as well as individual prosecutors, courts, and juries) onto the
agenda of more representative, more accountable, and more deliberative lawmaking
assemblies.”).
107. See Lafave, supra note 73, at 141.
108. Compare Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (“A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the
specific circumstances they confront.”), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465
(1972) (noting that the slowness of legislatures is no reason for judicial interference in
matters of lawmaking), and Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex.
2012), reh’g denied (Sept. 21, 2012) (“This Court presumes that “legislature deliberately and purposefully selects words and phrases it enacts, as well as deliberately and
purposefully omits words and phrases it does not enact.”).
109. Heather Mac Donald, Re-breaking the Windows, CITY J. (Jan. 31, 2014), http://
www.city-journal.org/2014/eon0131hm.html.
110. See Harry A. Chernoff et al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527,
532 (1996).
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crime,” even if that derision is false and ineffective.111 It almost goes
without saying that these concerns will remain the subject of electioneering, debates, and other political forums when it is time to elect local councilpersons. But a legislative solution would bring a certain
measure of transparency to a municipality’s police policy. This transparency coupled with democratic authorization of high-crime areas
could help heal the rift between police and community that exists in
some large metropolitan areas. A legislative solution may even
prompt greater political participation and voter turnout.
While the effect that a legislative solution would have on political
participation and voter turn-out is highly speculative, citizens whom
crime affects and those whose Fourth Amendment rights are diminished because of where they live ought to have their voices heard
when certain neighborhoods are designated as high crime. Since
crime is so prevalent in political discourse and the Court has ruled
that the character of a particular area is a constitutionally significant
factor in Fourth Amendment analysis,112 it is appropriate for the democratic process, not an ad hoc determination of law enforcement, to
address the question of which areas are high crime under Wardlow.
Legislative designations of high-crime areas would address public sentiment regarding crime by providing a democratic response to public
uproar that crime in certain neighborhoods deserves increased
attention.
Where an individual police officer’s determination of a high-crime
area is subject to criticism as being a pretext for discrimination and
impermissible hunches,113 a city council’s decision cannot be ascribed
to an inarticulate hunch because most city council deliberations are
recorded in minutes and are open to the public.114 Furthermore, the
dangers of pretextual designations would be eliminated by the objective data that would inform the decision and the public sentiment that
drives the election of councilpersons and their deliberation. Individuals affected by either high crime rates or oppressive police stop and
frisk policies could express their concerns at the voting booth. Like
any other issue of public concern, crime and the mechanisms of combating crime should be given the opportunity to play out in the democratic process, especially when the mechanism involves a scheme of
unequal constitutional protection.
By using legislative designations of high-crime areas in concert with
the exercise of other traditional duties and strategies, city councils
111. See H. Lee Sarokin, Tough on Crime/Soft on Crime: Redefining the Labels, 29
HUM. RTS. 7, 7 (2002).
112. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000).
113. See United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1583 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(Smith, C.J., dissenting).
114. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-14-1 (2013); IOWA
CODE § 21.3 (2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.835 (LexisNexis 2004); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 84-1413 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-318.10 (West 2013).
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could provide a concerted response to public outcry regarding crime
rates in many cities. Judicial deference to concerted actions of deliberate democratically elected bodies is more consonant with principles
of comity than is deference to on-the-spot determinations by individual police officers.115
Legislative designations put the imprimatur of the democratic process on stop and frisk policies designed to combat crime in certain
areas. Although it is far from clear how legislative designations of
high-crime areas would play out in the context of a § 1983 claim, like
Floyd, two things seem very likely: (1) the legislative designations
would deserve considerably more deference than the ad hoc determinations of individual police officers;116 and (2) municipal liability
would be clear because the existence of a policy or practice sufficient
to carry the force of law under Monell would be certain.117
Moreover, if a municipality can potentially be held liable under Monell for the police department’s use of high-crime areas in stop and
frisk policies then the municipality has a clear stake in the designation
of these high-crime areas. If a city’s funds are at stake when police
conduct stop and frisks in high-crime areas the city’s governing body
should have a say in how these areas are designated. It could be argued that city councils even have a duty to consider how their police
departments are employing the high-crime area factor because law enforcement’s use of high-crime areas can expose the municipality to
§ 1983 liability.118 Far from stepping on the toes of the executive,
making high-crime area designations part of the political process
squares with separation of powers principles.
As an arm of the executive, law enforcement officers are charged
with enforcing the law, not with making judgments that effectively diminish a class of citizen’s constitutional rights.119 The Constitution
does not permit executive officers to make ad hoc decision that an
individual cannot own a gun but it does permit legislatures to control
who cannot carry a gun in certain areas.120 Similarly, a decision that
115. Compare City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 451–52,
(2002) (deferring to city council’s finding that the secondary effects of adult oriented
businesses justified a restrictive zoning ordinance), with Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that de novo review of general matter determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause).
116. Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless
Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 105 (2007) (arguing that political process theory demands that general suspicionless searches and seizures, such as administrative searches and random drug tests should receive rational basis review).
117. See supra Part III.
118. See supra Part III.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. II.
120. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (“[N]othing in
our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws impos-
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diminishes Fourth Amendment guarantees should not be entrusted to
the individual agent of the executive but rather should be made by a
legislative body.
Courts readily and properly defer to the actions of legislatures because legislatures are charged with the task of lawmaking and are
democratically elected.121 An individual law enforcement officer is
neither democratically elected nor charged with the task of lawmaking. The current uncertainty with regard to high-crime areas and the
lack of a uniform evidentiary standard often results in mere deference
to an individual police officer’s impression of the area.122 By foreclosing an officer’s ad hoc judgment that a suspect is in a high-crime area,
a legislative designation also forecloses a court’s unseemly deference
to that decision.123
The high-crime area distinction under Wardlow, unlike most decisions of law enforcement that implicate the Fourth Amendment, is not
individualized. Traditional Fourth Amendment analyses, especially
stop and frisk analysis, entail scrutiny of “specific articulable facts that
taken together would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that
criminal activity is afoot.”124 The claim that an area is high crime is
not a claim specific to the stop and frisk incident; rather it is a categorical claim. The categorical nature of designating certain areas as highcrime areas smacks of lawmaking and is thus more appropriate for
legislatures than executives.

ing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”); Kachalsky v.
Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1806 (U.S.
2013) (“[T]he state may ban firearm possession in sensitive places . . . .”).
121. Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (noting that city
councils are in a “better position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate data on
local problems.”); see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)
(noting that “Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate
the vast amounts of data.”); see generally Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
244 (1984) (noting that state legislatures are just as deserving of judicial deference as
congress when making public use determination).
122. People v. Jackson, 979 N.E.2d 965, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 982
N.E.2d 772 (Ill. 2013) (finding that an officer’s uncontradicted and undisputed testimony, which is accepted by the trial court, is sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that the incident occurred in a high-crime area); United States v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t’s a high crime area, because the
officers say it’s a high crime area.”) (Kozinski, J., concurring); United States v. Dell,
487 F. App’x 440, 455 (10th Cir. 2012) (concluding that unchallenged officer testimony was sufficiently specific to indicate that investigatory detention took place in a
“high-crime area”).
123. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III (separation of powers principles dictate
that legislatures, not executives, make laws such as designations of “high-crime
areas”).
124. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Apart from the unequal scheme of constitutional protections they
create, high-crime areas are fraught with problems arising from the
vagueness and uncertainty of the distinction. Attaching constitutional
significance to high-crime areas affects the rights of many innocent
citizens who are only guilty of furtive movements. At the very least,
the democratically elected representatives of those citizens should
have a voice in deciding whether their Fourth Amendment rights will
be diminished. Providing a democratic forum to vindicate Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to high-crime areas will not only safeguard against pretextual high-crime area claims but also save considerable resources when the time comes to protect those rights in a
judicial forum.
The recent Floyd case, its settlement, and the statements made by
the Mayor and Police Commissioner bring into focus the inherent
problems with attaching constitutional significance to a fact that is not
specific to the incident that leads to a stop and frisk. Deciding when
police department’s use of high-crime areas to justify stop and frisks
rises to the level of policy or practice is a laborious task as the lengthy
Floyd opinion will attest.125 The problem of determining municipal
liability when police departments routinely rely on high-crime determination for stop and frisks is but one of the many problems with
high-crime areas.126
The temptation to claim presence in a high-crime area as pretext for
an unconstitutional stop and frisk is exacerbated by the uncertainty
regarding what is a high-crime area and what is not, especially when
courts tend to defer to the experience and judgment of police.127 Although requiring rigorous after-the-fact verification that an incident
took place in a high-crime area is an effective safeguard against claiming an area is high crime as pretext for discrimination, such rigorous
verification does not comport with promoting officer safety and the
need for officers to make quick decisions in the field.128 The limited
intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights are justified in the interest of
protecting police officers and the need for officers to make quick decisions in the field.129 Asking police to conduct an extensive calculus
before stopping and frisking a suspect will create hesitation and
thereby imperil the officer’s safety.
Courts, scholars, and lawyers have exerted considerable resources
to articulate and bring specificity to the high-crime area factor.130
Designating an area as high crime is a categorical designation. Be125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 557 (S.D. N.Y. 2013).
See supra pp. 564, 572.
See cases cited supra note 16.
See supra Part IV.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24.
See United States v. Wright (Wright I), 485 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2009).
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cause of the categorical nature of high-crime areas, they defy the specific articulation that is the hallmark of reasonable-suspicion analysis.
Instead of judges, police, and lawyers laboring to fit the square peg of
high-crime areas into the round hole of reasonable-suspicion analysis,
city councils should substitute their deliberate democratic judgment
for that of law enforcement. This legislative solution will foreclose the
legion of problems with high-crime areas that diminish Fourth
Amendment protections, imperil police and public safety, and expend
valuable judicial resources.

